Sunday, May 29, 2011

On 23rd May 2011, Mr. ISHIBASHI, Katsuhiko (born in 1944, Professor Emeritus, Kobe University) spoke at the Committee to Audit Administration in the 177th Session of the National Diet. Following is the full text.

 I thought I had warned enough at the public hearing of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives at the 162nd Session of the National Diet on 23 February, 2005.  I wish to reiterate here to express my deep disappointment that my earlier warnings had no influence and therefore of no use during the Session.  I therefore hope that today, my opinion may be useful to some extent.
             
It has been reported that Fukushima Daiichi disasters were due to chain of reactions: big tsunami, disabled emergency diesel generators, loss of all the electric power sources and inability to cool.  However I think there is a high possibility that this severe accident was caused by earthquake shocks before tsunami.
It is very crucial and I wish to emphasize it strongly because common atmosphere tells us as if one should not talk about it.

Mr. TANAKA, Mitsuhiko (former technical expert of nuclear reactor) wrote the same in the magazines, Sekai and Kagaku in April.  Regarding the No.1 Reactor, strong quakes might have damaged some pipelines, which lead to loss of coolant.  In other words, cooling ability was lost.  It is assumed that this loss of coolant caused melt down.  Tanaka’s discussion is based on thorough checks of data such as open data by TEPCO, water level in pressure vessel, pressure and pressure within containment.  It is highly possible that suppression pool was damaged by strong earthquake shocks in the No.2 Reactor.  So this means a loss of function to shut.  Mr. Tanaka wrote that this might have lead to leaks of radioactivity and hydrogen, hence hydrogen explosion in the No.2 Reactor.  I am a seismologist. Loss of coolant is quite possible from seismological point of view.  Shakes at the bottom of the foundation board in the nuclear reactor building, as reported by TEPCO, exceeds shakes presumed by earthquake-resistant structure in NO.2, NO.3 and NO.5 Reactors in east-west direction shakes.  Furthermore, there is a possibility that seismic motion exceeded the level of earthquake-resistant structure with regard to records taken underground, although its accuracy should wait for further analysis.  Even in case of excess, it may not be extreme as compared to the case of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in 2007.  The excess itself alone is very critical.  I should like to call your attention, in the Fukushima case, to the fact that duration of shakes was very long.  Duration caused by underground seismic waves at the magnitude 9.0 level was about 3 minutes.  This is very long.  Likewise, Fukushima Daiichi was affected by these waves and shakes were long.  Therefore, it is possible that lasting and repeated weighting might have caused damages.
On the other hand, it is very important to know that safety against earthquakes of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was confirmed by the National and Industrial Safety Agency and Atomic Energy Commission in 2009.  In other words, it was recognized that stopping, cooling and shutting functions were equipped.  But this accident implies that confirmation on safety against earthquakes was wrong.  I cannot yet conclude it but the issue is so important that it needs to be seriously discussed.  But at present, it seems to be somehow avoided.  I overheard that TEPCO might announce something today, something to the extent that pipelines were not damaged until tsunami came.  Once again, this issue should be discussed seriously and made open to public.  The very fact about excess beyond presumed shakes means problems in the guidelines to check on earthquake-resistant structure, revised in 2006.  Furthermore, if we assume that this serious accident occurred because of earthquake shakes, then the whole process of deliberations, related results and reliance would be lost.  Since 2006/ 2007, back checks have been conducted in all nuclear power plants in Japan.  We may have to re-do the whole process all over again.

Here is my second point. On 30th March, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency instructed electric power companies to take emergency safety measures against tsunami with regard to all the nuclear power plants in Japan.  In other words, this instruction perhaps was to implement emergency safety measures at all the nuclear power plants in Japan so they would be OK even in situations similar to the case of loss of all sources of alternating current electricity due to big tsunami as per the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.  So all the electric companies took actions such as acquiring vehicles which can generate electricity, building temporary water tanks at higher places, storing lots of hoses as well as simulations to operate these equipments.  These actions raise very serious problems.  One of the 2 problems is that the afore-mentioned first point was ignored.  Measures against tsunami alone do not guarantee safety.  Guidelines to check on earthquake resistant structures should be reviewed. Back-checks must be undertaken again. The second problem is that Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency instructed all the nuclear power plants in Japan to assume big tsunami and loss of all the power sources. This assumption itself is not in accordance with Guidelines to Check Locations of Nuclear Power Plants.  A copy of the Guidelines to Check on Locations of Nuclear Power Plants, a one-page document Reference No.3 is the very basis of related guidelines on safety checks and was approved by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1964.  Basic thinking contained in the Guidelines to Check Locations of Nuclear Power Plants, in particular, conditions of locations, basically goes as follows: in order to be prepared for an unlikely accident and to secure public safety, basic conditions of locations are necessary: locations where no past events with incitement to bring big accidents took place, where such events would never occur in future and where events to maximize disasters may be few.  It is clearly stated in the guidelines that such basic conditions of locations are necessary.  But now they urge to assume that big tsunami and related loss of all power sources may cause accidents in all the nuclear power plants in Japan.  This is surprising as it is clearly against conditions of locations.  Based on human common sense and conscience, I think it is crazy to operate nuclear power plants where big tsunami may occur.  As if a group of seasoned people in their 60’s and 70’s organizes a tour to climb the Northern Alps (in Japan) in the middle of winter after a snow storm warning, this is just not right.  In short, it is only nuclear power plants, just electric power plant, so they think.  There is no need, I think, to operate such a dangerous structure where big tsunami may come if its purpose is only to generate electricity.

Thirdly and to my regrets, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Nuclear Safety Commission are now supporting nuclear power plants.  I get similar impressions following 3.11 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant’s accident.  May I refer to a case I was directory involved?  In 2007, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plants were damaged by Chuestu Offshore Earthquakes in Niigata Prefecture and all the 7 reactors stopped.  At that time, I participated in discussions of the Niigata Prefecture Sub-Committee as its member.  Several researchers pointed out that there existed submarine active fault off the coast of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plants.  Nevertheless, TEPCO ignored this very huge submarine active fault.  TEPCO picked only a part of the 36km fault and assumed earthquakes at the magnitude 7.0 level to take place there.  In case of nuclear power plant, we must consider naturally such issues with safety first in mind, but TEPCO did nit respect it.  This, in a sense, can be interpreted as camouflage of earthquake resistance of nuclear power plant.  Please refer to the document Reference No.4 for details.  Nuclear and Industrial Safety Commission and Nuclear Safety Commission had taken such actions with initiatives or rather, systematically.  I wrote about it in the magazine “Kagaku” by Iwanami Publishing Company as well as in the readers’ column in the Mainichi Newspaper.  I am responsible for what I had written but the Nuclear Safety Commission never said anything to me.  Instead, they complained to the Mainichi Newspaper Company to correct or to delete my   article because they said the article was incorrect.  I remember this well and think it is a serious problem.  Actually, with regard to supporting nuclear power plants, there are quite a few experts and researchers on seismological geology.  They are a part of those who ignore submarine active faults.  It became explicit in discussions during a symposium of Japan Active Faults Research Group.  Such a situation may come from researchers’ ethics but more fundamentally, from organizational problems which leave researchers no choice but to support in government-linked research institutes and national and famous former national universities.  Conscientious people with different opinions can only remain silent.  That’s the best they can do due to organizational problems.  Japanese people are quite unfortunate in this regard.

The fourth point is that the Japanese Islands are most unsuitable on earth to build nuclear power plants.  Earthquake plots of the world show that earthquakes occur either on lines or belts.  Therefore, the whole Japan is completely covered with belts of earthquake activities.  The total area of Japanese territories, territorial waters and exclusive economic zone add up to a little less than 0.3% of the surface of the earth.  And about 10% of the total earthquakes concentrate within the same area.  Nuclear power plants should not be built on such places.  It is a common sense in Europe and the United States of America, as you can see in conditions to restrict nuclear reactors in Germany and the USA and the fact that certain nuclear power plants were shut down due to small active faults which might be treated like a trash in Japan.  It is so common that French and German people in Japan would never build nuclear power plants in such places like Japan.  I think Japan is not normal.  As I pointed out so far, there are very basic conditions regarding nuclear power plants and earthquakes.  So, nuclear power plants on an archipelago with earthquakes should not be operated just because they are safe within controlled safety measures.  Without fundamental safety, it is completely unfortunate for people living in Japan.  Fundamental safety, I think, means no nuclear power plants.  I also attached a cartoon on this subject.  This idea just occurred to me yesterday and I drew it in a hurry.  The subject is so difficult that people may not understand without something like cartoons, especially those in economic circle, politicians, public servants in administration and ordinary people who have certain knowledge.  My concern that they may not understand at all without cartoons resulted in the reference. (Cartoon: nuclear power plant with a catfish)  Nuclear power plants all over the world have fundamental common problems.  Mr. KOIDE Hiroaki (born in 1949 Assistant Professor of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute) and Mr. GOTO Masashi (Visiting Lecturer, Shibaura Institute of Technology) have pointed out serious problems.  But as a realistic seismologist, I think that Japanese nuclear power plants are different from those in France and Germany.  What is the difference?  Japanese nuclear power plants always come with earthquakes.  Suppose we build nuclear power plants, the same model as those in France or Germany, in Japan but earthquakes might occur just near-by!  No way.  It is not that simple.  All the nuclear power plants in Japan stand with earthquakes on their backs.  They come as a set like inseparable monsters.  Henceforth, no more new installations or expansions please.  Even those now under the process of planning should be stopped.  Earlier on, I referred to highly possible loopholes in Guidelines to Check on Earthquake-Resistant Structure.  Actually, there are loopholes.  As there was a loophole in setting standards of seismic motion, certain discussions urge revision again.  But if we do not go for new installations and expansions, guidelines to approve construction will not be needed.  I rather think that the following is necessary and deserves serious considerations; strict revisions of guidelines to evaluate risks or guidelines to maintain control of safe operations, then immediate founding of a third-party organization in order to evaluate risks regarding all the nuclear power plants in Japan and to rank them and shutting them starting from the top of the list with the highest risks.  The top is the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant.  It is shut now temporarily until measures against tsunami will have been completed but it needs to be shut down for ever.  Because shocks by (possible) Tokai Earthquakes, big continuous after shocks, upheaval and transformation of ground and huge tsunami will be awfully dreadful.  Measures against tsunami alone will not suffice for safety.  In 2009 when the new political power was born, I wrote with strong expectations to ask for stopping the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant and that the new administration’s responsibility vis-à-vis the world would be to avoid disasters by nuclear power plants.  I am sorry to say that it was realized only after they experienced the tragedy of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant’s accident.  I also wrote in 2009 that if we would sit and wait, we might commit a big crime of forbearance far beyond AIDS caused by transfusion of HIV-tainted blood products and BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) problems.  After all, we have committed a crime of forbearance.  Its responsibility goes not only to the current administration. It is also the past administrations’ crime, accumulated in 27 years, against people in Japan and the world.
One more point is that nuclear power plants except the Hamaoka are said to be OK.  This is out of question.  There are many dangerous nuclear power plants all over Japan and those in the Wakasaa Bay are the top on the list.  It is necessary to undertake immediate inspection of all these plants and to shut them down one by one.

And here is my last point. Despite my proposals presented so far, we must live with nuclear power plants for a while.  Stopping them does not guarantee safety.  Spent nuclear fuel is stored in nuclear power plants. This fuel must be kept safely under control for years to come.  And earthquakes may occur.  Therefore, the Nuclear Power Disaster Counter-Relief Act, Guidelines to Prevent Nuclear Power Plants Disasters and areas covered by EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone) must be revised as soon as possible.
I would like to introduce here a booklet of about 20 pages prepared by the State of Connecticut, situated in the northeast to New York of the United States of America.  Its title goes “Guidebook of Measures to Take in Emergencies at the Nuclear Power Plants in Connecticut”.  It is distributed normally to every household in the neighborhood.  It contains simple but thorough explanations such as; what it means by emergency, we operate nuclear power plants with utmost safety but emergencies might occur, what to do when residents are instructed to remain indoors and to evacuate themselves to other locations, what if children are in schools or nurseries.  Again, such a booklet is always in circulation.  Their telephone directory shows locations of shelters.  Such practice was never carried out in Japan.  Residents close to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants were told suddenly to leave to safer places.  In case of Iidate Village, 40 km away from the Fukushima Daiichi, people were told to evacuate immediately, leaving their livestock behind.  This is too harsh.  I believe that, from now on, residents around nuclear power plants should receive something similar to this booklet without delay.  Thank you

Thursday, May 26, 2011

On 23rd May 2011, Mr. ISHIBASHI, Katsuhiko(born in 1944 Professor Emeritus of Kobe University) spoke at the Committee to Audit Administration in the 177th session of the National Diet. Five major points are the following.

 1It has been reported that Fukushima Daiichi disasters were due to chain of reactions: big tsunami, disabled emergency diesel generators, loss of all the electric power sources and inability to cool. However I think there is a high possibility that this severe accident was caused by earthquake shocks before tsunami.
<ellipsis>
Mr. TANAKA, Mitsuhiko (former technical expert of nuclear reactor) wrote the same in magazines, Sekai and Kagaku in April.  Regarding the No.1 Reactor, strong quakes might have damaged some pipelines, which lead to loss of coolant.  In other words, cooling ability was lost.  It is assumed that this loss of coolant caused melt down.  Tanaka’s discussion is based on thorough checks of data such as open data by TEPCO, water level in pressure vessel, pressure and pressure within containment.  It is highly possible that suppression pool was damaged by strong earthquake shocks in the No.2 Reactor.  So this means the loss of function to shut.  Mr. Tanaka wrote that this might have lead to leaks of radioactivity and hydrogen, hence hydrogen explosion in the No.2 Reactor.  I am a seismologist. Loss of coolant is quite possible from seismological point of view.  Shakes at the bottom of the foundation board in the nuclear reactor building, as reported by TEPCO, exceeds shakes presumed by earthquake-resistant structure in NO.2, NO.3 and NO.5 reactors in east-west direction shakes.
<ellipsis>
 I should like to call your attention, in the Fukushima case, to the fact that duration of shakes was very long.  Duration caused by underground seismic waves at magnitude 9.0 level was about 3 minutes.  This is very long.  Likewise, Fukushima Daiichi was affected by these waves and shakes were long.  Therefore, it is possible that lasting and repeated weighting might have caused damages.
On the other hand, it is very important to know that safety against earthquakes of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was confirmed by the National and Industrial Safety Agency and Atomic Energy Commission in 2009.  In other words, it was recognized that stopping, cooling and shutting functions were equipped.  But this accident implies that confirmation on safety against earthquakes was wrong.
<ellipsis>
The very fact about excess beyond presumed shakes means problems in the guidelines to check on earthquake-resistant structure, revised in 2006.  Furthermore, if we assume that this serious accident occurred because of earthquake shakes, then the whole process of deliberations, related results and reliance would be lost.  Since 2006/ 2007, back checks have been conducted in all nuclear power plants in Japan.  We may have to re-do the whole process all over again.    

2On 30th March, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency instructed electric power companies to take emergency safety measures against tsunami with regard to all the nuclear power plants in Japan.
<ellipsis>
 Measures have been taken but left at least big problems.  The afore-mentioned point in was disregarded.  Measures against tsunami alone do not guarantee safety.  Guidelines to check on earthquake resistant structures should be reviewed. Back-checks must be undertaken again. The second problem is that Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency instructed all the nuclear power plants in Japan to assume big tsunami and loss of all the power sources. This assumption itself is not in accordance with guidelines to review location of nuclear power plants. 
<ellipsis>
Basic thinking contained in guidelines to review location of nuclear power plants, in particular, conditions of location basically goes as follows: in order to be prepared for an unlikely accident and to secure public safety, basic conditions of location are necessary: location where no past events with incitement to bring big accidents took place, where such events would never occur in future and where events to maximize disasters may be few.  It is clearly stated in the guidelines that such basic conditions of location are necessary.  But now they urge to assume that big tsunami and related loss of all power sources may cause accidents in all the nuclear power plants in Japan.  This is surprising as it is clearly against conditions of location.  Based on human common sense and conscience, I think it is crazy to operate nuclear power plants where big tsunami may occur. 
<ellipsis>
In short, it is only nuclear power plants, just electric power plant, so they say.  There is no need, I think, to operate such a dangerous structure where big tsunami may come if its purpose is only to generate electricity.       

3To my regrets, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Nuclear Safety Commission are now supporting nuclear power plants.  I get similar impressions following 3.11 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant’s accident.  May I refer to a case I was directory involved?   In 2007, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plants were damaged by Chuestu Offshore Earthquakes in Niigata Prefecture and all the 7 reactors stopped.  At that time, I participated in discussions of the Niigata Prefecture Sub-Committee as its member.  Several researchers pointed out that there existed submarine active fault off the coast of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plants.  Nevertheless, TEPCO ignored this very huge submarine active fault. TEPCO picked only a part of the 36km fault and assumed earthquakes at the magnitude 7.0 level to take place there.  In case of nuclear power plant, we must consider naturally such issues with safety first in mind, but TEPCO did not respect it.
<ellipsis>

4The Japanese Islands are most unsuitable on earth to build nuclear power plants.
Earthquake plots of the world show that earthquakes occur either on lines or belts.  Therefore, the whole Japan is completely covered with belts of earthquake activities.  The total area of Japanese territories, territorial waters and exclusive economic zone add up to a little less than 0.3% of the surface of the earth.  And about 10% of the total earthquakes concentrate within the same area.  Nuclear power plants should not be built on such places.  It is a common sense in Europe and the United States of America, as you can see in conditions to restrict nuclear reactors in Germany and the USA and the fact that certain nuclear power plants were shut down due to small active faults which might be treated like a trash in Japan.  It is so common that French and German people in Japan would never build nuclear power plants in such places like Japan.  I think Japan is not normal.
<ellipsis>
Nuclear power plants all over the world have fundamental common problems.  Mr. KOIDE Hiroaki (born in 1949 Assistant Professor of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute) and Mr. GOTO Masashi (Visiting Lecturer, Shibaura Institute of Technology) have pointed out serious problems.  But as a realistic seismologist, I think that Japanese nuclear power plants are different from those in France and Germany.  What is the difference?  Japanese nuclear power plants always come with earthquakes.
<ellipsis>
                                                                                              

5For a while we must live with nuclear power plants.  Stopping them does not guarantee safety.  Spent nuclear fuel is stored in nuclear power plants. This fuel must be kept safely under control for years to come.  And earthquakes may occur.  Therefore, the Nuclear Power Disaster Counter-Relief Act, Guidelines to Prevent Nuclear Power Plants Disasters and areas covered by EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone) must be revised as soon as possible.
<ellipsis>

The following is the original script in Japanese, spoken by Mr. ISHIBASHI, Katsuhiko at the Committee to Audit Administration in the 177th session of the National Diet on 23rd May 2011.

2011523日、第177回国会、参議院・行政監査委員会
参考人 石橋克彦(1944年生まれ 神戸大学名誉教授 )

私、2005223日、第162回国会、衆議院予算委員会の公聴会に出席して、警鐘を鳴らしたつもりだったのですが、残念ながらこの国会の中では、それが響かないで役に立たなかったようで大変残念に思っています。ということを最初にちょっと言わせていただきます。

今日の私の意見が多少なりともお役に立てばよいと願っています。
福島第一原子力発電所の大事故は、大津波によって非常用ディーゼル発電機が全部作動しなくなり、全電源喪失が起こって冷却ができなくなったからだといわれているが、実は、津波の前に地震の揺れそのものによって重大事故が発生した可能性がかなり大きいと思います。
これは非常に重要なことですが、ことさら何かそれに触れないように社会の中ではされている感がありますのでここで強調しておきたいと思います。

田中三彦さん(元原子炉製造技術者)が、すでに、4月の初めに発売された岩波書店「世界」の中に書いているし、4月の末に発売された「科学」の中でも書いていますけれども、地震の激しい揺れにより、1号機では配管の損傷がどこかで生じたであろう、それによって冷却材の喪失が起こった。つまり冷やすという機能が喪失した。この冷却材喪失が、メルトダウンにつながったという推定です。
田中さんの議論は東京電力から公開されているデータ、圧力容器の中の水位、圧力、それから格納容器の中の圧力、そういうデータを詳細に点検されての議論です。
2号機では、地震の激しい揺れによって、圧力抑制室に損傷が生じた可能性が大きい。これは、閉じ込める機能が喪失されたわけです。これで放射能も漏出するし、水素が漏れ出て、それが2号機の水素爆発につながったのであろうと田中さんは主張しています。

私は、地震学が専門ですけれども、地震学的にも冷却材喪失は十分あり得ることです。東京電力から公表されている原子炉建屋の一番下の基礎盤というところの揺れが、耐震設計で想定している揺れより、2号機3号機5号機の東西方向の揺れではオーバーしています。それから、これはさらに分析してみなければ正確なところは解りませんけれども、地下の記録でも耐震設計の基準とする地震動をオーバーしていた可能性があります。ただ、想定より超えた度合いは、2007年の柏崎刈羽のときに比べると、それほどはなはだしくはないが、超えていること自体非常に重要ですし、今回、地震学的に非常に注目すべきことは、振動の時間が非常に長かったことです。マグニチュード9.0という、地下で地震波を出している時間がとても長くて、3分間ぐらい地震派を出していました。それを受けた福島第一原子力発電所の揺れも、非常に長時間続いたために、長時間の繰り返し加重によって損傷を起こしたことは十分考えられます。
一方、非常に重要なことは、福島第一原子力発電所は、2009年に原子力安全・保安院と原子力安全委員会によって耐震安全性が確認されています。つまり、止める、冷やす、閉じ込めるという機能がちゃんと備わっていると認められたわけです。しかし、今回の事故により、耐震安全性の確認が誤りであった可能性が大きい。これは、まだ断定はできませんが、この問題は非常に重要ですから、厳重に議論する必要があります。ところが、今のところは、そこを何となく避けているようです。何か聞くところによると、本日、東京電力から何か発表があるみたいで、津波が来るまでは、配管の破損などは生じなかったというような発表があるようなことをちらっと聞きましたけれども、とにかくこれは、公開の場で厳重に議論されなければなりません。想定の揺れをすでに超えていること自体、2006年に改定された耐震設計審査指針に問題があることを意味していますし、それから、もし、重大事故が地震の揺れで起こったとすればなおさらのこと、全国の原発の耐震バックチェックが20062007年以降行われていますが、その審議プロセス、及び結果、その信頼性が失われるわけで、全部やり直す必要がでてきます。

2番目ですが、330日、原子力安全・保安院が電力会社に、全国の原発について、津波の緊急安全対策をするように指示を出しました。これは、全国の原発が福島第一原発のような大津波をこうむって、全交流電源喪失という事態になっても大丈夫なように緊急安全対策をしなさいということで、全国の電力会社は、電源車を用意したり、高いところに応急的な貯水槽を設けたり、ホースをたくさん用意したり、それを操作する訓練をしたりして、これで安全性が格段にあがったというようなことが言われていますが、この一連の事態は、非常に大きな問題を含んでいます。問題は、2つありまして、ひとつは、先ほど言いました第一点の問題を無視していることです。津波対策だけすれば大丈夫ということではなく、耐震設計審査指針を見直して、バックチェックもやり直さなければ安心とはいえません。2つめの問題としては、原子力安全・保安院自らが全国の原発で、大津波と全電源喪失ということを想定しなさいといったわけですけれども、そういうことを想定すること自体が原子炉立地審査指針というものに反しています。原子炉立地審査指針が資料3に1枚紙で付いていますが、これは、一連の安全審査指針類の一番もとに来るものでして、昭和39年に原子力委員会が決定したものです。原子炉立地審査指針の基本的な考え方として、原則的立地条件として、「万一の事故に備え公衆の安全を確保するためには、原則として次のような立地条件が必要である。大きな事故の誘因となるような事象が過去においてなかったことはもちろんであるが、将来においてもあるとは考えられないこと、また災害を拡大するような事象も少ないこと。」こういうことが原則的立地条件として必要であると謳っているわけです。ところが、大津波とそれによって、全電源喪失という大きな事故を全国の原発で想定しましょうということですから、これは驚くべきことです。そんなものは、立地の条件に反しているわけです。そもそも人間の良識というか常識から考えて、大津波をかぶる恐れのあるような場所で原発を運転するということ自体、私は正気の沙汰ではないと思います。これは、あたかも真冬に暴風雪警報が出ている北アルプスへ6070歳代の熟年ツアー登山をやろうと言っているようなもので、とてもおかしい。ようするに、たかが原発です。たかが発電所なわけです。例えば、遭難した漁船を救うための巡視船なら、どんな荒波でも航海しなければならないが、発電するために何もこんな危ないものを大津波のあるところで頑張って運転することはないと私は思います。

3番目は、原子力安全・保安院と原子力安全委員会というものが、現状では、残念ながら原発擁護機関になっています。福島第一原子力発電所の事故、3.11以降を見ていてもそうですが、2人の参考人(小出裕章さん、後藤政志さん)からもそういうお話がありましたけれども、私が直接関わった例としては、2007年、柏崎苅羽原発が新潟県中越沖地震で被害を受けて、全7機が止まったことがありまして、そのとき、私は新潟県の小委員会の委員として議論に加わっていました。東京電力は、運転再開に向けて何人かの研究者から存在が指摘されていた柏崎苅羽原発の沖あいに存在する海底活断層、この非常に長大な海底活断層を無視しました。東京電力は、長さ36kmの断層だけ、その一部分だけを取り上げて、そこにマグニチュード7.0の地震を想定しました。しかし、可能性として、もっと長大な60kmくらいの長いものがある可能性がある。そういうものは、原発の場合は、安全サイドに立って、当然考慮しなければいけないが、東京電力は、それを無視しました。これは、ある意味、原発耐震偽装といってもいいことでして、詳細は、資料4に書いてあります。そういうことを、原子力安全・保安院、原子力安全委員会も率先してというか組織的に行ったわけです。私は、そのことを岩波書店の「科学」という雑誌に書いたのですけれども、さらに毎日新聞の一般向け投稿欄に投稿しました。ところがそれに対して、原子力安全委員会は、発言責任のある書いた私には何も言ってこないで、毎日新聞社に対し、あの記事はおかしいから訂正しろ、取り消せというようなことを言った。そういうことまでありまして、非常に問題であると思います。実は、こういう原発を擁護することについては、非常に多くの地震地質の専門家、研究者が加担しています。海底活断層を無視することに加担している。これは、日本活断層研究会という学界のシンポジュームのときの議論などでも、あからさまにそういうことが出てきました。こういう状況は、研究者の倫理ということもありますが、もっと根深くは、政府系の研究機関、あるいは、国立大学、有名旧国立大学、そういうとこの研究者が加担せざるを得ないような構造的な問題があります。反対意見があっても良心的な人はせめて黙っているぐらいしかできないとう構造があります。これは、国民にとっては、非常に不幸なことです。

それから、4番目は、そもそも日本列島は、地球上で最も原発建設に適さない場所です。世界中の地震をプロットすると、地球上では地震というのは、線上ないしは、ベルト上に発生しているわけですが、非常に活発な地震活動のベルトの中に日本列島は、全域がすっぽり入ってしまうわけです。面積では、日本の国土と領海と排他的経済水域の一部を合計した場合、地球の表面積の0.3%弱ですが、その範囲内に地球の全地震の約10%が集中しています。こういうところには、そもそも原発は造るべきではないのです。それは、欧米では、常識的なことです。ドイツやアメリカにおける原子炉の規制の条件や、日本だったらゴミ扱いされるような小さい活断層が問題になって原発が実際に閉鎖されたという例をみても、もし、フランス人やドイツ人が日本列島に住んでいれば、彼らは、絶対にこんなところに原発は造らないであろうという常識的なことです。日本が異常だと思います。(1)から(4)に示したように、非常に基本的な原発と地震に関する条件というものがありまして、そういうことを考えれば、地震列島における原発は、制御された安全の範囲で大丈夫だから運転しようというのでは困るのです。本質的な安全でなければ日本列島の上に住んでいる人間にとっては、全く不幸であって、本質的安全というのは、原発が存在しないことだと思います。これに関して、資料に漫画があります。昨日、思いついて私が急いで描いたのですが、こういうことでも描かなければ、あまりにもわからない、特に、経済界の人、あるいは、政治や行政に関わっている人、それから、そういう話を聞いている一般国民、どうもまるでわかってないらしいということで描きました。(原発にナマズが付いている漫画)原発というのは、本質的には世界中で同じ問題をかかえています。小出裕章さん(1949年生まれ 京都大学原子炉実験所助教)、後藤政志さん(芝浦工業大学非常勤講師)から指摘があったような深刻な問題があります。ですが、私、地震学をやっている人間として、現実的なことを考えると日本の原発は、フランスやドイツの原発とは違います。何が違うかというと、日本の原発は、地震付き原発です。フランスやドイツと同じ原発があって、それを日本列島に建てた場合、たまたま近くで地震が起こるかもしれないよ!なんて、そんな生易しいものではなく、日本の原発は全て、まるで、おんぶお化けみたいに地震がくっ付いているわけです。地震とセットになっているわけです。ですから、地震付き原発なんてものは、あっては困る。そういうことです。したがいまして、今後、新設、増設というのは、やめてほしい。建設計画中のものもやめるべきでしょう。耐震設計審査指針に不備がある可能性が非常に高いと、さっき言いましたけれども、現に不備がある。基準地振動の策定に不備があったわけですから、再改定しなければいけないという議論もありますが、もう新設、増設をしなければ、設置許可のための指針はいらなくなるわけで、私としては、むしろリスク評価のための指針、あるいは、安全運転を管理する保安のための指針というものを厳重に作りなおした上で、早急に第三者機関を設立して、日本列島の全原発に関してリスク評価をし、順位付けをして、リスクの高いものから順に今あるものも閉鎖していくということを真剣に考えなければいけないと思います。筆頭は、浜岡原発ですが、これは、津波対策が完了するまでとりあえず閉鎖なんてものではなくて、永久に閉鎖する必要があります。というのは、東海地震による地震の揺れ、大きな余震の続発、地盤の隆起変形、それから大津波、これらすべて恐ろしいのでありまして、津波対策さえすれば大丈夫というものではありません。私、2009年に新政権が誕生した時に期待を込めて浜岡原発を止めてほしい、原発震災を回避することが新政権の世界に対する責任であるということを書きましたけれども、残念ながらそれは、福島第一原発事故の悲劇を経験したあとでなければ実現しなかった。手をこまねいていれば、薬害エイズやBSE問題を超絶した不作為の大罪を犯すことになるだろうと2009年に私は書きましたけれども、結局、不作為の大罪を犯してしまったことになります。これは、決して現在の政府の責任だけではなくて、27年間の歴代の政府が積み重ねてきた国民に対する、あるいは、世界に対する罪であると思います。それからもう一つ、浜岡以外の原発は大丈夫というようなことが言われていますが、とんでもないことです。若狭湾の原発を初めとして、日本全国に危険な原発はたくさんあります。それらについて早急に点検をして順次閉鎖に向かっていくことが必要です。

最後にひとつだけ、そうは言ってもまだ我々は、当分の間、原発に付きあっていかなければなりません。止めたからといってそれで安全なわけではなく、使用済み核燃料が原発に保管されている。それをあと何十年も安全に管理しなければいけない。その間には地震が起こるでしょう。そういうことで、原子力災害対策特別措置法や、原子力防災指針、それによるEPZの範囲などは早急に改めなければなりません。
最後に紹介したいのは、アメリカのコネチカット州で出ている冊子ですけれども、20ページくらいの冊子がニューヨークの北東にあるコネチカット州で出ています。「コネチカット州原子力発電所非常事態対策ガイド」というものです。平常時からこういうものが原発の近隣住民に漏れなく配られていて、そこには、非常事態とはどんなものであるか、つまり、私たちは、安全なように原発を運転していますが、それでもなおかつ非常事態が生じるかもしれませんということで、非常事態とはどういうものか?屋内待避を指示されたらどうするか?避難移動を指示されたらどうするか?子どもが学校保育所に行っている場合はどうするか?そういうことが簡潔ですが、漏れなく記されています。こういうものが常時配られているわけです。それから、電話帳にもちゃんと避難場所が出ています。そういうことを日本では何もしてこなかった。今回、福島第一原子力発電所の周辺住民に対しては、いきなり、避難しろ、飯館村なんて40何キロ離れていても急に出て行け、牛も置いてゆけ、あまりにもひどいわけで、これからは早急にこういうものを原発周辺の人々に配る必要があると思います。
以上です。